In this paper the structure of the NSA-designed block cipher Skipjack is examined. By cryptanalysing a large number of variants of the algorithm, we give plausible arguments for several principles behind the Skipjack design. The conclusion is that the algorithm seems to be carefully designed. ?
Introduction
Skipjack is a 64-bit block cipher that is used in the Clipper Chip [7, 14] . The design principles of Skipjack have not been published and the algorithm itself was only recently made public by the NSA [12, 13] .
Skipjack is a remarkably simple cipher, and one interesting feature is the use of two di erent types of rounds. These are referred to as A, and B-rounds and encryption with Skipjack consists of ÿrst applying 8 A-rounds, then 8 B-rounds, once again 8 A-rounds and ÿnally 8 B-rounds. Earlier papers have demonstrated that the number of rounds was apparently not chosen with a large margin of security [2, 3, 10] , but they did not focus on the high-level structure of Skipjack.
In this paper we examine the structure of Skipjack, focusing especially on understanding the rationale behind the design choices embodied in the cipher. A central motivation is the observation that Skipjack is just one representative from a very large design space of related ciphers, and in particular there are many parameters which could easily be changed to get a di erent construction with presumably di erent properties. Consequently, it is natural to wonder whether the designers of Skipjack missed any opportunities to improve the cipher by selecting one of the other alternatives in this design space.
In an attempt to shed light on these issues, we propose the following working hypothesis: Skipjack appears to be essentially the only strong cipher in a very large family of weaker constructions. We provide a large body of evidence for this conjecture by showing that many other natural choices of the design parameters lead to apparently weaker cryptosystems. 1 There are several natural ways to vary the design of Skipjack without a ecting its basic 'look and feel' too much: 1. We can vary the relationship between Skipjack's two round-types. 2. We can vary the ordering of the two types of rounds used in Skipjack.
Each of these design elements allows for many plausible choices of parameters, and each design element can be varied independently. In this way, we get a large space of Skipjack-variants. In each case, we show that changing the deÿnition of Skipjack can lead to certiÿcational weaknesses not present in the real Skipjack. This suggests that any simple change to Skipjack risks introducing new vulnerabilities, and in particular that Skipjack may have been carefully chosen as the optimal candidate from this family of ciphers.
Of course, there are many other possible variations of Skipjack, e.g., we can vary the way the round counter is injected into each round, and we can vary the key schedule and the S-box used. However, the attacks we present in this paper on variants of Skipjack would work more or less with unchanged complexities for any of these other modiÿcations.
This paper is organized as follows. First, Section 2 describes Skipjack and introduces some other important background material. Section 3 examines the relationship between the A-and B-rounds. Then in Section 4, we study the round ordering of Skipjack and show that Skipjack's ordering seems to be better than many natural alternatives. Next, we consider the importance of the round counter in Section 5. Afterwards, we sum up and discuss our results in Section 6.
Background
Skipjack is a block cipher that supports a 64-bit block size and a 80-bit key. The block is internally divided into four 16-bit words, where each round applies a keyed non-linear permutation to one word from the block.
Skipjack uses two di erent types of round functions, the A-rounds and the B-rounds. Each encryption consists of a total of 32 rounds, applied in a speciÿc order: ÿrst we apply 8 A-rounds, then 8 B-rounds, then another 8 A-rounds, and ÿnally we ÿnish with 8 more B-rounds. We repeat the deÿnitions of the A-rounds and the B-rounds here for 
In this paper, '+' denotes the bitwise exclusive-or operation, and 'counter' stands for a round counter that starts at 1 and counts up to 32. See Fig. 1 for an illustrated version.
The G k box takes a 16-bit input and a 4-byte subkey k, and is itself a 4-round Feistel cipher using in each round a byte permutation F and a key-byte k i . It follows that the inverse of G is equal to G itself using the subkeys in reverse order, except for a swap of the halves of both the input and the output. All of the remarks in this paper are independent of the speciÿc choice of the byte permutation F and are instead directed at the high-level structure of Skipjack.
The Skipjack key schedule speciÿes how each 32-bit round subkey k is derived from the 80-bit key K. The 80-bit key K is split up into ten bytes, denoted K 0 through K 9 . Then the key bytes are repeated in rotating order, and each round takes the next 32 bits for use as its subkey. For example, the ÿrst round uses K 0 ; : : : ; K 3 , the second round uses K 4 ; : : : ; K 7 , and the third round uses K 8 ; K 9 ; K 0 ; K 1 .
We assume that the reader has some passing familiarity with the fundamentals of truncated di erential cryptanalysis [9, 10] , but we will brie y review the basic ideas here. In a di erential attack, the attacker chooses two plaintexts with a speciÿed di erence between them and attempts to predict with some probability how the di erence will evolve during the encryption process. The deÿning feature of a truncated di erential attack is that the cryptanalyst predicts the di erence for only some portion of the block, leaving the remainder of the di erence unpredicted. For this paper, the di erence of two texts T; T will refer to the exclusive-or T + T of their values.
In the analysis of Skipjack, it is natural to break the block into four 16-bit words and to predict the di erence of some of those words. In this paper, our predictions will specify for each word whether that word should be zero or non-zero; note that we usually do not attempt to distinguish between the 2 16 − 1 non-zero values. Thus, we might use the notation (a; b; 0; c) to refer to a di erence that is predicted to be zero in its third word, and write (0; 0; a; 0) 1rA →(0; 0; 0; a) for a 1-round truncated di erential which predicts that the output di erence after 1 A-round will take the form (0; 0; 0; a) when the input di erence has the form (0; 0; a; 0).
With this notation, we easily obtain some trivial truncated di erentials of probability one, such as (a; 0; 0; 0) Also, the r-round di erential → may be concatenated with a s-round differential → when the intermediate di erences agree (i.e., = ), and in this case we obtain a (r + s)-round di erential → whose probability is the product of the original di erentials' probabilities.
If we are able to ÿnd a truncated di erential of su ciently large probability that covers all 32 rounds of Skipjack, we may be able to distinguish Skipjack from an ideal cipher. Moreover, a good truncated di erential for all but the last round often allows us to recover key material by guessing the last-round subkey and checking for right pairs that follow the di erential.
The technique of structures is useful in many truncated di erential attacks since it allows us to generate large pools of candidate pairs using a relatively small number of chosen texts. For instance, we can obtain 2 2n−1 pairs of texts with input di erence of the form (0; a; b; c) by requesting the encryption of 2 n chosen plaintexts whose ÿrst word is ÿxed (for n648). These 2 n texts are collectively called a structure, and if we want more than 2 95 pairs we may obtain many structures by using di erent values of the ÿrst word for each structure.
Similarly, many techniques are known for e ciently identifying right pairs and for recovering key material from them. See the literature [9, 10] for more details.
The relationship between A-and B-rounds
The Skipjack A-and B-rounds are closely related in their internal structure: the structure of a B-round is almost the structure of the inverse of an A-round, di ering only by a word-wise swap before and after. However, it may not be immediately obvious why this particular relationship was chosen in Skipjack or that this choice has important implications for the security of Skipjack. In this section, we explore this subject more closely, develop several apparent design principles, and show why all the other choices lead to serious weaknesses in the cipher.
The equivalence of encryption and decryption
The encryption and decryption functions of Skipjack may be written as
Beware: the symbol A should be thought of not as a speciÿc transformation -because of the round constants and the key schedule, each keyed instance of the cipher will apply di erent transformations in di erent rounds -but rather as a shorthand for the high-level structure of the cipher. In other words, (1) should be interpreted as saying that the structure of Skipjack encryption uses 8 A-rounds followed by 8 B-rounds, and so on. (Beware: the G k box is not an involution, so the symbol A −1 in the formula should be thought of as a shorthand reference to the structure of the inverse A-round, but using G k rather than G −1 k .) In other words, encryption through a B-round may be implemented as decryption through an A-round preceded and followed by a -swap (except for inverting G k ). The encryption function of Skipjack may then be written as
In this notation the decryption function of Skipjack can be written as
Note the strong similarity: the structure of encryption and decryption di er only by a -swap before and after the cipher. Thus, the design of the A-and B-rounds seems to be an implementation feature. (See also Section 4 for another example of how this implementation consideration bears on the round ordering.) As a result, we get the following observation. This property also has the following obvious implication.
Fact 2. With uniformly chosen keys; Skipjack has equal security against chosen plaintext attacks and chosen ciphertext attacks.
These two properties seem to be an important design principle for Skipjack-like ciphers, and in particular this illustrates an important facet of the relationship between the A-and B-rounds in Skipjack.
The choice of
The above-described similarity between encryption and decryption in Skipjack would also be valid for any other involution , including the identity function. In the following we give a possible explanation why = (1 2)(3 4) was chosen in the o cial Skipjack cipher.
To understand the implications of other choices for , we must look at the interaction between A-and B-rounds. Recall that B = • A −1 • . Clearly, an A-round followed by an inverse A-round is unfortunate, since three of four words will be left unencrypted (through G) in two rounds of encryption. This suggests that taking = id could signiÿcantly weaken the cipher and thus would be a poor choice.
Good choices for . To examine the good choices of involutions , consider four consecutive rounds. If all rounds are either A-rounds or inverse A-rounds, all four words input to the four rounds will have been encrypted (through G). Therefore, consider the following choices of four rounds with a transition from A-rounds to inverse A-rounds:
Since 2 and 3 are the inverses of each other it su ces to consider cases 1 and 2. Let the four input words be (a; b; c; d) and ÿnd the possible involutions , such that after four rounds of encryption, in each of the cases 1. and 2., none of a; b; c; d appears unencrypted (through G). It is easily checked that after two A-rounds the input words b and c have not yet been input to the G-function. With e.g., = id it is also easily checked that these two words are unencrypted after an additional two inverse A-rounds. It turns out that for 1, the only possible involutions with the desired property are (1 2)(3 4) and (1 3)(2 4). However, for the latter, case 2 leaves the input word b, unencrypted. And indeed, the only which has the desired property is (1 2)(3 4), as chosen in Skipjack. Any other choice of would weaken the cipher by introducing a 4-round subsequence that leaves one input word unencrypted under G.
We conclude that the involution was presumably introduced to strengthen Skipjack and to minimize the negative interaction of A and A −1 . Still, we are yet to answer the question of why use 8 A-rounds followed by 8 B-rounds and not, e.g., 4 A-rounds followed by 4 B-rounds. This question is answered in the following section. 4. The round ordering: why (8A; 8B)?
In this section the interaction between A-rounds and B-rounds is closely examined. The structure of Skipjack variants using n A-rounds followed by m B-rounds will be referred to as an (nA; mB) * structure. We begin by introducing a simple design goal:
Design principle 1. Encryption and decryption should be symmetrical.
This goal is clearly desirable, because it simpliÿes implementation e orts and ensures equivalent security against chosen plaintext and chosen ciphertext attacks; see Section 3.1. The above design principle immediately has the following implication. Corollary 1. One should consider only the symmetrical structures (nA; mB) * , i.e., those where n = m.
This design principle allows us to narrow down the search space by eliminating all structures with n = m. Moreover, it explains why the o cial Skipjack cipher uses a (nA; mB)
* round structure where n = m: any other choice would forfeit the advantages of a symmetrical cipher. Still, it does not explain why n = 8 is chosen in the o cial Skipjack standard, or help us understand whether other round orderings might not improve on the standard construction.
In this section, we examine several natural alternative round orderings for Skipjack and show that many of them allow for better attacks than those available in the real Skipjack construction. For the remaining constructions, truncated di erentials have been identiÿed, which have much higher probabilities than for real Skipjack. It is left as an open question to apply these di erentials in cryptanalytic attacks. See also Table 1 for a summary of our attacks on the variants with a di erent round ordering.
We start by examining why it is better to start with A-rounds and end with B-rounds; this reduces the search space by a factor of two. Then, we eliminate most of the remaining round orderings by exhibiting truncated di erential attacks.
In the following we write G k (·) for every application of G, where the subscript k is ÿxed to indicate that the function is keyed, and we omit the round counter.
Why A before B?
One natural question when looking at Skipjack is why use the A-rounds before the B-rounds. Does the ordering make a di erence to the security of Skipjack? We argue that the answer is yes, that Skipjack's ordering is preferable to the alternative, and that this is a crucial design principle with important ramiÿcations on security.
Di usion considerations hint at why this might be so. A-rounds exhibit better diffusion (in the encryption direction) than B-rounds, so it is natural to suspect that it might be better to start with the best di usion available. In the following, we show how truncated di erential cryptanalysis may be used to develop more persuasive evidence for this design principle.
We also note that an earlier work [10] already shows some indications of this design principle. This paper analyzed two 16-round Skipjack variants, a (8A; 8B) variant and a (8B; 8A) variant, ÿnding attacks on the former with 2 17 chosen plaintexts and 2 34 work, while the latter can be broken with just 2-3 chosen texts and 2 46 -2 29 work. The dramatic di erence in security between the two variants suggests that the order of the rounds may be very important.
A deeper inspection of [10] reveals strong evidence that reversing the ordering of the A-and B-rounds can be harmful in two important ways:
Starting with B-rounds makes it easier to ÿnd long truncated di erentials The authors of [10] found a 12-round truncated di erential of probability 1 for the variant starting with B-rounds, whereas the ÿrst 12 rounds of the di erential used to analyze the variant starting with A-rounds has probability 2 −32 . In general, B-rounds exhibit poor di usion in the forward direction, and thus it is easier to pass through B-rounds with a truncated di erential.
Ending with A-rounds makes it easier to use these truncated di erentials in a key-recovery attack. A second factor that made the attack on (8B; 8A) so e cient is the relative ease of peeling o the ÿnal rounds of a cipher which ends with A-rounds. That attack may be viewed as a 7-R attack which needs to guess a surprisingly small amount of key material to be able to look deep inside the cipher. (Compare to the (8A; 8B) cipher, where only a 1-R analysis was possible because of the quantity of key material that must be guessed to peel o more than one round [10] .) In general, this property is to be expected: A-rounds exhibit poor di usion in the reverse direction, so peeling o a few ÿnal A-rounds is not di cult.
All in all, the e ect is that shorter truncated di erentials may be used when analyzing a cipher that ends with A-rounds; this, of course, usually increases the e ciency of the attack.
For Skipjack-like constructions, we conclude that starting with A-rounds and ending with B-rounds is likely to be stronger than the alternative.
Additional evidence for this proposition may be found below, where we show that the (8B; 8A) 2 Skipjack-variant is more vulnerable to truncated di erential cryptanalysis than the standard (8A; 8B) 2 version.
Truncated di erentials
Structure (A; B) * . Consider an A-round followed by a B-round. The encryption function over these two rounds is (omitting the counter)
As seen, the two outer output words depend only on the two middle input words, and the two middle output words depend only on the two outer input words. This means that the variant (A; B)
* is very weak, since there are truncated di erentials of probability 1 for any number of rounds. The following 4-round truncated di erential holds with probability one and can be iterated to any number of rounds: One consequence is that the (2A; 2B) * cipher -with any number of rounds -can be broken with two chosen texts or with 2 16:5 known texts. As in the case of the (A; B) * cipher, this weakness may also be viewed as a simple di usion failure. However, we will see shortly that truncated di erentials provide a more sensitive measure of di usion than is available with conventional techniques, so we will ÿnd it useful to apply the machinery of truncated di erential cryptanalysis throughout.
Structure (3A; 3B)
* . There are 21-round truncated di erentials of probability one and there are impossible di erentials for at least 30 rounds. The following di erential has probability zero: This di erential was found by concatenating two 15-round di erentials, each of probability one. A pair of plaintexts with di erence (0; a; 0; 0) leads to a di erence in the ciphertexts after 15 rounds of (c; d; e; 0). Similarly, a pair of ciphertexts of di erence (0; 0; 0; b) decrypts back in 15 rounds to ciphertexts of di erence (f; g; 0; h), where h = 0. Thus, there is a miss-in-the-middle [3] and a di erential of probability 0 over 30 rounds. This situation is much better for the attacker than in the case of the original Skipjack, where only 24 rounds can be covered with such di erentials [3] . In addition, the 30-round di erential may be concatenated with a truncated di erential of probability one over 2 A-rounds: (0; 0; 0; b) 2rA →(c; c; 0; 0); where c = 0. In total, this yields a 32-round di erential of probability zero, and thus, 32 rounds of (3A; 3B) * can be distinguished from random with about 2 33 chosen plaintexts. Using structures of 2 16 plaintexts di erent in the second words only, one can form about 2 31 pairs with the di erence (0; a; 0; 0). With 2 17 such structures one obtains totally 2 48 pairs of plaintexts. Using this Skipjack variant, the resulting pairs of ciphertexts will never have the di erence (c; c; 0; 0), whereas for a randomly chosen permutation one expects one such pair.
Structure (3A; 4B) * . Although we have argued already that one should use only structures (nA; mB) * with n=m, we include this variant because it is extremely weak. There is a 7-round iterative, truncated di erential of probability one: The ÿrst and third 8 rounds have probabilities one. The second 8 rounds have a probability of 2 −32 and the last 7 rounds a probability of 2 −16 . There are several truncated di erentials of this form, so the probability is higher than stated.
The probabilities of the found di erentials are much higher than for similar di erentials found for (unmodiÿed) Skipjack. This provides evidence that Skipjack's (8A; 8B) * is preferable to the (4A; 4B) * alternative. The ÿrst 8 rounds and the last 4 rounds have probabilities 1. The second and third 8 rounds have each a probability of 2 −16 . We have already seen theoretical reasons to be very skeptical of ciphers that start with B-rounds or end with A-rounds. The above di erential has a probability higher than what have been identiÿed for real Skipjack. This provides additional evidence that starting with B-rounds or ending with A-rounds may reduce security.
Structure (16A; 16B) 1 . This is the only remaining natural alternative to (8A; 8B) 2 . Truncated di erential cryptanalysis does not seem as powerful against the (16A; 16B) 1 structure as for the other alternatives, and we do not know of any compelling attacks against the full 32-round (16A; 16B) cipher.
However, the middle 28 rounds of (16A; 16B) may be distinguished from a random cipher using known plaintexts and truncated di erentials. By easy calculations one ÿnds the following truncated di erential of probability one: Because of the symmetry between A-and B-rounds there is a similar di erential for decryption through 14 A-rounds. With 2 56 known texts, we get 2 111 pairs, of which 2 63 will have the di erence (a; a; 0; 0) in the middle. We ÿlter, looking for pairs whose di erence has second ciphertext word and ÿrst plaintext word both non-zero. For a random cipher, we expect n = (1 − 2 48 such pairs, which is about one standard deviation above the mean for a random cipher. Therefore, with 2 56 known texts and very little computation we may distinguish the middle 28 rounds of (16A; 16B) from a randomly chosen permutation. This does not prove that the (16A; 16B) 1 structure is weaker than (8A; 8B) 2 , but it may indicate a perhaps-undesirable property of the (16A; 16B) structure.
The round counter and the key schedule
The key-schedule of Skipjack is remarkably simple when compared to the keyschedules of other modern block ciphers, e.g., the AES candidates. The ÿve candidates of the ÿnal round of the AES process have complex key-schedules and the round keys are often encrypted. In Skipjack the round key bytes are computed by a simple rotation of the input key bytes. The above Facts 1 and 2 look like design principles of Skipjack and could also explain the role of the counter. Without the counter there will be keys for which encryption and decryption will be very similar (with the exception of an application of to both plaintext and ciphertext), and pairs of keys for which encryption with one key is very similar to decryption with another key [2] . Such keys are present in the DES [11] and regarded as weak keys. With the counter, these problems seem to disappear.
Discussion
These observations suggest several general principles for the design of Skipjack-like ciphers:
Seek symmetry. A cipher is symmetrical if encryption and decryption have the same structure. Symmetry is a beneÿcial implementation property which simpliÿes the task of implementation and which may reduce resource requirements, since one can support both encryption and decryption at once with just one cryptographic engine. Also, a symmetrical cipher has identical resistance to chosen-plaintext and chosen-ciphertext attacks, which is a desirable security property. This is not a new observation -see, e.g., [1, 6, 15] -but it does not seem to be as widely known as it perhaps could be [8, 16] .
Avoid too much symmetry. Of course, symmetry sometimes allows for clever cryptanalytic attacks. In Skipjack, symmetry is broken with round counters, and this helps avoid, e.g., complementation properties and slide attacks. While this design principle may seem to contradict the previous one, the con ict is not so bad as it may ÿrst appear. The Skipjack round counters appear to prevent most attacks that attempt to exploit their symmetry, while retaining the equivalence between chosen-plaintext and chosen-ciphertext security against a very large class of attacks (namely, the class of all attacks that ignore the round counters -and note that this class includes di erential and linear cryptanalysis as well as their variants).
Minimize bad interactions between the round-types. We have seen considerable evidence that the A-and B-rounds interact poorly where they are applied in consecutive rounds. In general, transitions between round-types appear to reduce security. Moreover, if is not chosen carefully, this bad e ect can be much worse than necessary.
We expect that these principles will also be applicable to other ciphers with similar structure, including FROG [8] and CAST-256 [1] .
We have also answered a number of detailed questions about the design and structure of Skipjack. We summarize some of those contributions here:
Why two types of rounds? The reason Skipjack does not use just A-rounds or B-rounds is that both round types exhibit considerable asymmetry: for example, A-rounds have excellent di usion in the forward (encryption) direction, but very poor di usion in the reverse (decryption) direction; B-rounds behave dually.
Why are B-rounds a near-inverse of A-rounds? This arrangement allows us to build a symmetrical cipher out of asymmetrical round functions: if B=A −1 , then the (nA; nB) * structure is self-inverse. More generally, if B= −1 •A −1 • where = −1 , the resulting construction is also self-inverse (up a bit-permutation before and after the cipher). This also explains why is an involution in Skipjack.
Why use = (1 2)(3 4)? Skipjack uses a word permutation which may be expressed in cycle notation as =(1 2)(3 4). It turns out that this is the unique permutation which maximizes security and minimizes the bad interaction at the boundary between A-and B-rounds. See Section 3.
Why apply A-rounds before B-rounds? This ordering makes it much harder to peek deep inside the cipher. With B-rounds before A-rounds, one may mount a 7-R attack and look as far as 7 rounds, into the cipher, without too much e ort; but applying A-rounds ÿrst makes it very expensive to look more than one round deep (i.e., 2-R attacks are too costly). Also, the (8B; 8A) * structure is weaker against truncated di erential cryptanalysis than the real (8A; 8B) * cipher. See Section 4. Why use (8A; 8B) * ? All of the alternatives we have examined appear to weaken the security of Skipjack. In particular, the (nA; mB) constructions with n; m ¡ 8 are especially vulnerable to truncated di erential cryptanalysis; and the (nA; mB) * constructions with n; m ¿ 8 allow the cryptanalyst to ÿnd better truncated di erentials for each half of the cipher. Also note that symmetry considerations suggest we should use n = m.
Why use a round counter? Eliminating the round counter from Skipjack introduces complementation properties that can be used to speed up exhaustive keysearch [2, 3] . Also, constructions without round counters appear to be more susceptible to slide attacks [4] .
Why use a 80-bit key? With a longer key, di erential-style attacks would have a lower complexity than exhaustive keysearch [3] , so it is natural to choose 80 bits as an upper bound on the e ective keylength of the algorithm. At the same time, keys much shorter than 80 bits are too weak to resist exhaustive keysearch for long [5] .
Our 'explanations' of why Skipjack looks the way it does, must (of course) be categorized as unproven conjectures. Nonetheless, we feel that the body of the evidence supports our view.
